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ABSTRACT
The unfolding argument was presented by Doerig et.al. in [1] as an argument to show that causal
structure theories (CST) like IIT are either falsified or outside the realm of science. In [2] and then [3],
the authors mathematically formalized the process of generating observable data from experiments
and using that data to generate inferences and predictions onto an experience space. The resulting
substitution argument built on this formal framework was used to show that all existing theories
of consciousness were pre-falsified if the inference reports are valid. If this argument is indeed
correct, it would have a profound effect on the field of consciousness as a whole indicating extremely
fundamental problems that would require radical changes to how consciousness science is performed.
However in this note the author identifies the shortcomings in the formulation of the substitution
argument and explains why it’s claims about functionalist theories are wrong.
Keywords Consciousness · Falsification · Unfolding Argument · Substitution Argument · IIT · Causal Structure ·
Krohn-Rhodes Theorem
1 Introduction
The ‘unfolding argument’ presented in [1] made the case that IIT and other causal structure theories (CSTs) are either
already falsified or outside the realm of science. This argument was first extended in [2] and a more generalized version
was presented as the ‘substitution arguments’ in [3].The author here will assume that readers are pretty familiar with all
3 papers -[1], [2] and [3]. The focus will be on the last one which we find to be the most general version of the arguments
and the most broad in claims. It is very interesting work, accessible and proposes a descriptive mathematical framework
that could be very useful moving forward. For the sake of brevity, we will borrow the symbols and terminologies from
[3] as much as possible to point out the errors in that model and make suitable corrections. With these corrections
incorporated, we should be able see that the substitutions argument does not apply for functionalist theories (or at best
have not been proven to do so) in [3].
In this short note, we will start by introducing some relevant concepts and definitions from [3] in section 2. The main
contribution of this note is section 3, where we present arguments as to why the results of the substitution argument does
not apply for functionalist theories of consciousness by pointing what the formalism missed. The note will conclude in
section 4 summarizing the ideas presented here.
2 Understanding the Substitution Argument
We start with the summary of the different parts of the figure from section 2.5 in [3] in detail, since the error stems from
these very definitions.
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Figure 1: This picture illustrates substitutions. Assume that some data set o with inference content or is given. A
substitution is a transformation T of physical systems which leaves the inference content or invariant but which changes
the result of the prediction process. Thus whereas p and T (p) have the same inference content or, the prediction content
of experimental data sets is different. Different in fact to such an extent that the predictions of consciousness based on
these datasets are incompatible (illustrated by the non-overlapping circles on the right). Here we have used that by
definition of Por , every p ∈ Por yields at least one data set o′ with the same inference content as o and have identified
as o and o′ in the drawing [3].
1. P denotes a class of physical systems, each in various different configurations. In most cases, every p ∈ P
thus describes a physical system in a particular state, dynamical trajectory, or configuration.
2. obs is a correspondence which contains all details on how the measurements are set up and what is measured.
It describes how measurement results (data sets) are determined by a system configuration under investigation.
This correspondence is given, though usually not explicitly known, once a choice of measurement scheme has
been made. O is the class of all possible data sets that can result from observations or measurements of the
systems in the class P . Any single experimental trail results in a single data set o ∈ O, whose data is used for
making predictions based on the theory of consciousness and for inference purposes.
3. pred describes the process of making predictions by applying some theory of consciousness to a data set o. It
is therefore a mapping from O to E.
4. E denotes the space of possible experiences specified by the theory under consideration. The result of the
prediction is a subset of this space, denoted as pred(o). Elements of this subset are denoted by ei and describe
predicted experiences.
5. inf describes the process of inferring a state of experience from some observed data, e.g. verbal reports,
button presses or using no-report paradigms. Inferred experiences are denoted by er.
Under these definitions for the different components, falsification is defined (Definition 2.1 in [3]) as there is a
falsification at o ∈ O if we have inf(o) /∈ pred(o). A substitution is defined (Definition 3.1) as a or-substitution if
there is a transformation S : Por → Por such that at least for one p ∈ Por - pred · obs(p)∩ pred · obs(S(p)) = φ. The
crux of the paper i.e. the substitution argument (represented in the Fig.(1) here) is built using a number of proposition
and lemmas, and is given in Theorem 3.10 from [3] -
Theorem 3.10 - If inference and prediction data are independent, either every single inference operation is wrong or
the theory under consideration is already falsified.
Inference and prediction data is defined as independent (by Definition 3.8) if for any oi, o′i and or, there is a variation
v : P → P such that oi ∈ obs(p), o′i ∈ obs(v(p)), but or ∈ obs(p) and or ∈ obs(v(p)) for some p ∈ P .
The authors in [3] then suggest that the unfolding argument against IIT is a special case of the substitution argument,
and the latter applies to all known frameworks for the science of consciousness including functionalist frameworks. It is
a pretty big claim that all functionalist frameworks have every single inference wrong or have already been falsified.
Since the author’s contention in this note is whether the substitution argument has been properly applied with respect to
functionalist frameworks, we will quote from section 3.4.4 from [3] where this is discussed -
Artificial neural networks. ANNs, particularly those trained using deep learning, have grown increasingly powerful
and capable of human-like performance (LeCun et al., 2015; Bojarski et al., 2016). For any ANN, report (output) is
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a function of node states. Crucially, this function is non-injective, i.e. some nodes are not part of the output. E.g.,
in deep learning, the report is typically taken to consist of the last layer of the ANN, while the hidden layers are not
taken to be part of the output. Correspondingly, for any given inference data, one can construct a ANN with arbitrary
prediction data by adding nodes, changing connections and changing those nodes which are not part of the output. Put
differently, one can always substitute a given ANN with another with different internal observables but identical or
near-identical reports. From a mathematical perspective it is well-known that both single-layer ANNs and recurrent
ANNs can approximate any given function (Hornik et al., 1989; Schafer and Zimmermann, 2006). Since reports are just
some function, there are viable universal substitutions that provably exist.
A special case thereof is the unfolding transformation considered in Doerig et al. (2019) in the context of IIT. The
arguments in this paper constitute a proof of the fact that for ANNs, inference and prediction data are independent
(Definition 3.8). Crucially, our main theorem shows that this has implications for all minimally informative theories
of consciousness. A similar results (using a different characterization of theories of consciousness than minimally
informative) has been shown in Kleiner (2019).
While we have introduced the most relevant parts here, we strongly encourage readers to read the full paper in [3]. We
will now explore the shortcomings of the substitution argument in the next section and explain why it has not been
properly applied to functionalist frameworks.
3 What the Substitution Argument Misses?
The work in [3] is a very interesting base to build from for further formalizing the science of consciousness. However the
broad mathematical picture it paints presents a low resolution view of experimental work and modeling methodologies
that coarse-grains some very important details. In their paper, Hoel and Kleiner referred to neural networks during their
discussion of functionalist frameworks and the equivalence of feedforward and recurrent networks that can produce
the same input-output behavior (as utilized in [1]. We will discuss what is missed in their framework using a simple
example from a machine state functionalism picture which was used in [2] (A much broader argument equivalent to the
unfolding argument was presented in [5] using the Krohn-Rhodes decomposition [6], [7] of finite state automaton).
Since neural networks can be decomposed into finite state automata, the work presented here can be extended to cover
the cases discussed in [3].
From [4], we have machine state functionalism to be - any creature with a mind can be regarded as a Turing machine
(an idealized finite state digital computer), whose operation can be fully specified by a set of instructions (a “machine
table” or program) each having the form: If the machine is in state Si, and receives input Ij , it will go into state Sk
and produce output Ol (for a finite number of states, inputs and outputs).
A machine table of this sort describes the operation of a deterministic automaton, but most machine state functionalists
(e.g. Putnam 1967) take the proper model for the mind to be that of a probabilistic automaton: one in which the
program specifies, for each state and set of inputs, the probability with which the machine will enter some subsequent
state and produce some particular output.On either model, however, the mental states of a creature are to be identified
with such “machine table states” (S1, S2, .., Sn). These states are not mere behavioral dispositions, since they are
specified in terms of their relations not only to inputs and outputs, but also to the state of the machine at the time.
Let us now set up the machine state functionalism picture under the framework presented in [3]. Consider a physical
system p ∈ P that produces the finite state automaton shown with the corresponding transition table is given in
Fig.2(a). The transition table which captures the relationship between the current state, inputs and next state specifies
the functional structure. The pred and inf functions (correspondences) operate on these automaton states, inputs and
outputs to the space of E and generate both oi and or as shown in Fig.2(b).
In our case here, the variation map T (p) is simply a Krohn-Rhodes (KR) decomposition which produces a homomorphic
cascaded automaton (that might have a different state space and transition map - we will deal with isomorphic case later)
with the same input-output characteristics as shown in Fig.(3). In this figure we have a variation T (p) of the physical
system p which produces a different transition table (at the bottom) corresponding to this KR decomposition while
maintaining the same input-output characteristics. Since inf obtained by a verbal report (for example) are functions
of the output, the KR-decomposed state machine will produce the same inf . However since this transition table is
different, application of the pred function on the states and their transitions (i.e. functional structure) should produce
a different prediction of the experience, hence indicating s successful substitution i.e falsification of machine state
functionalism if the inference report is to be believed.
To identify what the argument missed, let’s take another step closer and focus on the pred function. In the 1st
instance when dealing with p, we have the pred function which maps the internal states and inputs (the transitions
to the next state are a function of the these two) to an experience in E. For example, this might look something like
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Experiences E
pred
inf
Physical system p
obs
(a)
(b)
Figure 2: (a) 2-bit/4 state finite state automaton and it’s corresponding transition table indicating the next state for every
current state and input. (b) A functionalist framework generating a transition table from a physical system p using the
obs correspondence. The pred and inf functions act on this state machine to produce model predictions and inference
reports on the experience space E.
pred(current− state = 00, input = 1, next− state = 10) =’happy’ and inference report of ‘happy’. Now with the
inference report being fixed, there would be a substitution T (p) that generates a different transition table as per the KR-
decomposition, we have that pred(current− state = 000, input = 1, next− state = 001) =’sad’. Clearly the pred
fucntion mapped to different experiences for the same inference report. But we should notice that argument space for
the pred function has now changed with respect to the machine states from {00, 01, 10, 11} to {000, 001, ..., 110, 111}.
In order to be consistent, we need to have a different prediction function pred′ which is properly defined and can act on
the new state space to generates maps to E. Thus we rewrite pred(current−state = 000, input = 1, next−state =
001) =’sad’ to pred′(current− state = 000, input = 1, next− state = 001) =’sad’.
Clearly we can see that for the substitution argument to be successful, we need pred[obs(p)] ∩ pred[obs(T (p))] = φ.
But when properly accounting for the change in the prediction function, what we have here is that pred[obs(p)] ∩
pred′[obs(T (p))] = φ, which is not falsification by the very definition. One could argue that a theoretical framework
could have a set of prediction functions {pred} and if pred, pred′ ∈ {pred}. Then a slight modification in the original
definition of or substitution allowing for multiple prediction functions would allow one to infer that a framework has
been falsified if pred[obs(p)] ∩ pred′[obs(T (p))] = φ. This captures the main drawback of the entire mathematical
formalization - it operates at an high level with low resolutions, which coarse-grains out some of these crucial nuances.
Let us now explore why the substitution argument still does not work even with a modified definition for substitution.
Under this new definition, we can have a substitution if pred[obs(p)]∩pred′[obs(T (p))] = φ where both pred, pred′ ∈
{pred}or . Assume you are a scientist working in the science of consciousness. You generate the datasets from system p
and use a state machine functionalist picture to generate the transition table of the 2-bit state machine A (with 4 states).
You then proceed to use a prediction function pred that maps these states and inputs to space of experience E. Now
you are working with the transformed system T (p) which produces data from which you extract the transition table
for the 3-bit machine A′. We assume that A and A′ are related through a KR-decomposition and maintain the same
input-output relationships and inference reports. You can use your original pred function only if the new 3-bit state
space is suitably coarse-grained to the original 2-bit space (suitably here referring to consistency to be maintained with
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Figure 3: A detailed look into the substitution argument using variation T on the physical system p, in the case of a
machine state functionalist framework. The inference reports inf in both cases are the same while the predictions pred
vary on the experience space E
respect to the KR-transformation). Of course, by the very nature of the KR decomposition, if the state-space change
is properly implemented, we would obtain the pred results that is identical to results obtained by prediction from A.
The other option is to identify a new prediction function pred′ which can operate on the 3-bit state space of A′. This
function cannot be picked independently of our knowledge of both A and pred. In fact if we know that A and A′ are
related through a KR-transformation, then the choice of pred′ specifically depends on pred and should be chosen such
that pred[A] = pred′[A′] in order to maintain consistency. However this constraint on the choice of pred′ immediately
entails that the substitution argument fails with respect to functionalist theories. We would specifically need erroneous
methodology with respect to the state space change to make the substitution argument here.
We can clarify this further with a very simple analogy of Cartesian and polar coordinates (Note that this is not an
example, but a simple analogy to pump our intuitions about the larger idea and like all analogies does not perfectly
map to the original concept). Let the angle θ be the equivalent of the result of pred function onto the experience space,
and say the inference report will be the circle generated with origin as center and radius=
√
x2 + y2. The angle θ
in a 2D case using the Cartesian coordinates (x, y) is given by the function F as θ = F (x, y) = tan−1
(
y
x
)
. Now
there is a very mathematical transformation M that maps the Cartesian coordinates (x, y) to polar coordinates (r, θ) -
M : (x, y) → (r, θ), where r =
√
x2 + y2 and θ = tan−1
(
y
x
)
respectively. In this analogy, M plays the role of T
variation map in [3]. Note that the circle generated by the polar coordinates (i.e.inference report) remains the same over
the transformation M . We can see that applying F on the new polar coordinates to generate θ will give a different value
i.e. F (x, y) 6= F (r, θ) and is in fact nonsensical since the function F is only defined over (x, y) (even though we have
two sets of numbers in both cases). But this is what the authors in [3] are expecting us to do when they apply the exact
same pred function on the transition table generated by T (p) in order to generate the substitution argument. In the
polar coordinate system, let us say the angle be given by a different function G(r, θ) (equivalent to pred′). Consider the
functions F , G and M . Given the mapping between (x, y) to (r, θ) through M , F and G are not independent of each
other. With F and M fixed, an arbitrary choice of G is not possible if the objective of G is to calculate the angle θ. To
be consistent, we need to pick G(r, θ) = θ i.e. the choice of G is validated by ensuring that the angle calculated in
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both systems need to be equal to each other - F (x, y) = θ = G(r, θ). For the substitution-like argument to work in
this case, you would need all the functions F , G and T to be appropriately picked to ensure consistency, and still have
F (x, y) 6= G(r, θ) which would not be possible by the very definition.
Thus once the finer details in the differences between different prediction functions are accounted for, we can see
that for (machine state) functionalist frameworks, the substitution argument would only work under the following bad
methodological scenarios -
• Trying to apply the pred function on a domain space on which it is not defined i.e. trying to apply F defined
in the (x, y) domain on (r, θ) and expect to get accurate answers.
• Assuming pred and pred′ are not constrained by each other and the variation map T i.e. F and M constrain
G such that it has to give the same angle θ. Picking pred′ arbitrarily is bound to give inaccurate predictions.
The next argument against the author’s objections would be to point towards the case of isomorphic KR-decompositions,
in which the number of system states and the global network topology remains consistent and the only difference
corresponds to a permutation in the state’s labels [5]. Our original argument rested on the difference between the
size of the state space of the different state machines. But what if the KR-decomposition of state machine produces
another with the same number of states? This argument once again arises due to the coarse-grained view created by
the original framework. To understand this better, let us go back to the case of a scientist working performing these
experiments. The scientists uses the observation function obs on physical system p to generate different datasets upon
which the transition table is constructed and the pred function is defined. Now consider the case where the scientist
is operating on an isomorphic KR-transformation T (p) such that the global topology and number of states remain
consistent, while state labels are permuted. In the most straightforward scenario, application of obs on T (p) produces
an identical state machine as the earlier case and the application of pred produces the same result i.e. there is no
substitution or subsequently falsification with pred[obs(p)] = pred[obs(T (p))]. Moving on to the scenario where
application of obs on T (p) produced a state transition table with the same number of states and transition topology but
with labels permuted. It seems like the substitution argument wins out here, since the pred function can be applied here
as well with no change in the state space dimensions but obtaining a different prediction results. However this is once
again not the case due to the following reasons - as the scientist applies obs to generate the isomorphic machine with
permuted labels, it is reasonable to assume that the labeling scheme is contained within obs in the manner in which the
experiment is setup. Now when the labeling scheme is changed (as required to permute the state symbols) during the
process of generating datasets, we can keep track of this change with respect to the original labels and thus understand
the label-label map between the two state machines. While the pred function can technically be applied on the new state
machine, it would be poor practice to directly do so knowing the change in label scheme, without first un-permuting the
state symbols. We need to first un-permute the labels and then we can apply the pred function on the state machine
with the original labels. This would produce the same prediction results as the earlier case. We can think about this as
replacing the pred once again with a new function pred′ = pred · unpermute. With this definition of pred′, we go
back to the case of utilizing pred′ discussed earlier in this section. We see that with the permutation taken into account,
we have pred[obs(p)] = pred[unpermute(obs(T (p)))] and the substitution argument fails. We will make this clear
with a simple example - consider running experiments on physical system p, generating a 2-bit (4 state) finite state
automaton by picking a labeling scheme by assigning to specific physical observables (like say voltage highs/lows
are binary ‘1’/‘0’s) and making predictions on the experience space by applying pred on the states of the automaton.
Next, you are working on different physical system T (p) and generate an isomorphic 2-bit state machine in which the
labels of the states are changed by flipping the labeling assignment i.e. voltage lows/highs are now mapped to binary
‘1’/‘0’s. Of course the original pred function can still be applied to the 2-bit state space of this new automaton, but it
would be overly optimistic to expect the same prediction results on the experience space as the original state machine
given the knowledge of labeling scheme change. The commonsense methodology to make predictions would be to
generate a new function pred′ which swaps the labels first and then applies pred to the resulting state of the automaton.
Once the labels are flipped and we apply the prediction function, we should expect to get the same results as the earlier
state machine (how could we not?). Note that while the independence/dependence of prediction and inference data
was discussed in [3], the authors did not study this dependence between different pred functions, and the relationship
between pred and obs. Their mathematical framework as presented does not recognize these crucial interdependencies
that exist between T , obs and pred, which results in it’s erroneous claims.
The translation from state machine picture to the examples of neural networks discussed in the original paper is
straightforward. As stated in [3] - “ for any given inference data, one can construct a ANN with arbitrary prediction
data by adding nodes, changing connections and changing those nodes which are not part of the output. Put differently,
one can always substitute a given ANN with another with different internal observables but identical or near-identical
reports”. This simply maps to either changing the state space of the network and/or relabeling the states and thus will
not work. While the author here has specifically focussed on state machines and neural networks, we suspect that
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objections of the same flavor can be constructed against the other examples of universal computers and intelligences if
they are cast under a functionalist picture. We will now conclude this note by summarizing the results in this paper.
4 Summary & Conclusion
The substitution argument presented in [3] would have massive implications in the field of consciousness if it ‘pre-
falsifies’ all the current major frameworks of consciousness and points towards a new approach in this research
area. However the mathematical formalization of the observation-prediction-inference process coarse-grains out
some important details which would implicitly invalidate the claims made in the paper with respect to functionalist
frameworks. We would need to follow poor experimental and modeling methodologies to allow for the substitution
argument to apply on functionalist frameworks and falsify it. Once we take a more fine-grained view and account
for the dependencies between these different components, the substitution argument once again simply reinforces the
results of the unfolding (like) arguments [1], [5] that the integrated information theory (and causal structures theories)
are falsified if the inference report are taken to be valid. The science of consciousness is safe for now and we should not
be hasty in abandoning existing frameworks and methodologies to explore phenomenology-first approaches.
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